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JUDICIAL AUDITING
MATT SPITZER and ERIC TALLEY*
ABSTRACT
This paper presents a simple framework for analyzing a hierarchical system of
judicial auditing. We concentrate on (what we perceive to be) the two principal
reasons that courts and/or legislatures tend to scrutinize the decisions of lower-
echelon actors: imprecision and ideological bias. In comparing these two reasons,
we illustrate how each may yield systematically distinct auditing and reversal be-
haviors. While auditing for imprecision tends to bring about evenhanded review/
reversal, auditing for political bias tends to be contingent on the first mover's cho-
sen action. Examples of these tendencies can be found in a number of legal applica-
tions, including administrative law, constitutional law, and interpretive theories of
jurisprudence. Our analysis also suggests that political "diversity" among initial
decision makers (in addition to its other laudable goals) may be an important and
generally underappreciated means for economizing on judicial administrative costs.
I. INTRODUCTION
NEARLY everyone recognizes that delegating authority conserves scarce
institutional resources. Indeed, as the regulatory state has expanded and
evolved in increasingly complex and subtle directions, virtually every gov-
ernmental entity has by necessity delegated at least some of its traditional
decision-making authority.' Legal institutions are no different: we now
* Spitzer is William T. Dalessi Professor of Law, University of Southern California Law
School, and Professor of Law and Social Science, California Institute of Technology. E-mail:
mspitzer@law.usc.edu. Talley is Associate Professor of Law, University of Southern Califor-
nia Law School. E-mail: etalley@law.usc.edu. Thanks to Scott Altman, Jean-Pierre Benoit,
Scott Bice, Steve Burbank, Bruce Chapman, Kevin Davis, Pete Farnsworth, Gillian Hadfield,
Steve Marks, Judith Resnik, Ted Sims, and seminar participants at Boston University Law
School, University of Toronto Law School, the 1998 University of Southern California Sym-
posium for Judicial Independence and Accountability, and the 1999 Western Economic Asso-
ciation meetings for helpful comments and discussions. Sassoun Nalbandian provided excel-
lent research assistance. All errors are ours.
There is now ample evidence that both the regulatory state and the degree of internal
auditing within it have grown consistently throughout the twentieth century, even during pe-
riods where deregulatory parties dominated the presidency and/or Congress. See Richard H.
Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 2 (1995).
A similar phenomenon appears manifest in Great Britain. See, for example, Christopher
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stand witness to a correspondingly vast and stratified system of decision-
making hierarchies, populated by judicial or quasi-judicial actors-particu-
larly within lower-level courts and administrative agencies-each of whom
has been delegated the de jure or de facto authority to make initial regula-
tory, legal, and/or policy decisions.2 Moreover, within a broader analytical
framework, it is sometimes appropriate (with the exception of constitutional
jurisprudence) to conceive of the entire judicial branch of government as a
delegated decision maker for legislative and executive entities.3
The benefits of delegation, however, come hard-earned. In spite of all its
economizing attraction, delegation (by definition) divorces at least some
real authority from a central, accountable actor, creating a fissure within
which at least two types of institutional conflict are bound to thrive. First,
lower-level decision makers may possess relatively limited resources to col-
lect and process the information that is relevant to the ultimate policy
choices at stake, thereby leading to an increased likelihood of error. And
second, those who are entrusted with initial decision-making authority need
not share the same aspirations or interpretive ideologies as their superiors
in the hierarchy, thereby leading to greater strategic manipulation.
While each of these potential problems has been studied in isolation, their
combination has garnered significantly less attention among legal scholars.4
Our chief goal in this essay is to tease out how error costs and agency costs
interact with one another within ajudicial system and, in particular, how they
affect the nature of oversight exercised by upper-echelon actors (for example,
high courts) on their lower-level counterparts (for example, trial courts). Using
a game-theoretic model ofjudicial review, we illustrate how the dual concerns
of (1) imprecision and (2) ideological bias affect equilibrium auditing stra-
Hood et al., Bureaucratic Gamekeeping: Regulation of UK Public Administration 1976-1996
(Economic and Social Research Council study L124251015, September 1997) (noting that
since the mid-1970s, the number of auditing and inspecting bodies in the United Kingdom
has grown by nearly 20 percent and the staff associated with those bodies has grown by
around 60 percent).
2 In federal administrative agencies, the initial decisions are made by administrative law
judges (ALJs). The percentage of AU decisions reviewed at higher levels within the agency
varies widely. See the data presented in S. Breyer et al., Administrative Law and Regulatory
Policy 792-94 (1998).
' For instance, the U.S. Constitution explicitly authorizes Congress to "make all Laws
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution . . . all . . . Powers vested
by this Constitution in the Government of the United States." U.S. Const. art. I, § 8. This
power includes, inter alia, the ability to change law in a way that alters or nullifies the pro-
spective application of existing judicial opinions, and even retrospective application of such
opinions to appealable cases or those pending appeal. See, for example, Plaut v. Spendthrift
Farms, 514 U.S. 211 (1995).
' See, for example, McNollgast, Legislative Intent: The Use of Positive Political Theory
in Statutory Interpretation, Law & Contemp. Probs., Winter 1994, at 3; Steven Shavell, The
Appeals Process as a Means of Error Correction, 24 J. Legal Stud. 379 (1995).
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tegies employed by upper-echelon actors. Our analysis of this model leads
to a prediction that these strategies turn critically on which concern tends
to predominate. On the one hand, when lower-court imprecision predomi-
nates, a rational upper-echelon decision maker will tend to adopt an even-
handed policy of intervention, in which the likelihood of review and reversal
depends relatively little on the precise content of the lower court's decision.
Conversely, when concern over political bias predominates, a rational up-
per-echelon decision maker will often favor a significantly more contingent
strategy, using the precise holding reached below to decide whether to re-
view that decision (or alternatively, to choose the intensity of review).
We will further argue that the auditing strategy described above helps
explain some of the traditional conflicts over judicial review. In particular,
our analysis reveals that when lower courts are heterogeneous in their ideol-
ogy, seemingly identical holdings issued by two different lower courts need
not be treated alike on appeal. In addition, our analysis provides a useful
empirical prediction that bears significantly on the ongoing debate sur-
rounding purported "threats" to judicial independence.5
Finally, our analysis isolates a potential benefit that flows from political
differences between lower- and upper-echelon decision makers, particularly
when both imprecision and political bias coexist. Indeed, when an upper-
level actor delegates authority to an ideological "clone" that is nonetheless
susceptible to error, the upper-level actor may have to adopt a costly strat-
egy of reviewing a relatively large number of holdings. In contrast, when
authority is delegated to a politically distinct (but equally error-prone)
lower-level actor, the upper-level actor can use her counterpart's political
differences as a type of screening mechanism to assist her in deciding
whether she should review a particular decision.6 Moreover, this economiz-
ing characteristic of political diversity within hierarchies holds true even
when (and in fact especially when) the lower court's information about the
"empirical" world is relatively noisy or imprecise.
The remainder of this paper consists of four parts. In Section II, we posit
and analyze a game-theoretic model of judicial decision making within a
two-tiered hierarchy. There are a number of possible interpretations of such
a hierarchy. For example, it might (alternatively) represent the relationship
between lower and higher courts, administrative agencies and district
courts, or a unitary (statute-interpreting) judiciary and a unitary (statute-
' See, for example, ABA Commission on Separation of Powers and Judicial Independence,
An Independent Judiciary (1997) (hereinafter ABA Report).
6 For example, were the Supreme Court decidedly more liberal than a circuit court on a
particular issue, then a decision by that conservative lower court to uphold a relatively liberal
statute (or alternatively, to strike down a relatively conservative one) provides a sufficiently
strong signal to the Supreme Court that it need not review the instant opinion.
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making) legislature.' We then demonstrate that the decision-making heuris-
tics described above characterize equilibrium behavior within the strategic
framework of the model. We also show that an error-prone lower-echelon
actor may, ironically, be audited relatively less frequently when its political
ideology is distinct from that of the upper-echelon actor. In Section III, we
attempt to apply these general arguments more specifically. We argue that
our strategic account of decision-making heuristics spawns intuitions that
are helpful within a number of legal settings, including administrative law,
constitutional law, interpretive theories of jurisprudence, and the tension be-
tween judicial independence and accountability. Section IV presents con-
cluding remarks followed by a technical Appendix.
II. A MODEL OF JUDICIAL AUDITING
In this section we develop our principal arguments more formally,
through an institutional model of hierarchical judicial review. In particular,
we characterize a plausible equilibrium allocation of authority between a
lower court and a higher court, when the latter faces costs in reviewing
lower-court opinions. We are ultimately interested in characterizing the
equilibrium strategy of the higher-echelon actors (such as appellate courts
or legislatures) in auditing the decisions of lower-echelon actors (such as
trial courts or administrative agencies), and its relationship to both ideologi-
cal differences and measurement error within the lower-echelon actors.
The analysis below fits squarely within the category of so-called rational
actor models within political science and economics; we assume that the
relevant law-creating actors (in this case, agencies, courts, and/or legislative
bodies) have well-specified preferences regarding outcomes and that they
act in a way that is strategically calculated so as to satisfy these preferences,
given their beliefs about the preferences and actions of other actors.8
7 Although it may seem peculiar at first to think of a legislative entity as a judicial actor,
within the strict statutory (as opposed to constitutional) context, legislatures are widely
known to act in a manner that is de facto tantamount to reviewing-and possibly overrul-
ing-perceived errors in statute interpretation by traditional judicial actors. See note 1 supra.
8 Similar approaches are employed by Donald R. Songer, Jeffrey A. Segal, & Charles M.
Cameron, The Hierarchy of Justice, Testing a Principal-Agent Model of Supreme Court-
Circiut Court Interactions, 38 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 673 (1994); David Epstein & Sharyn O'Hal-
loran, A Theory of Strategic Oversight: Congress, Lobbyists, and the Bureaucracy, 11 J. L.
Econ. & Org. 227 (1995); and McNollgast, Politics and the Courts: A Positive Theory of
Judicial Doctrine and the Rule of Law, 68 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1631 (1995). Some have called
the approach the "attitudinal model," stressing its emphasis on the dominant the role that
political ideologies play relative to traditional legal formalism in affecting outcomes. See, for
example, Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Essay: Judicial Partisanship and Obedience
to Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 Yale L. J. 2155,
2157 (1997). Our approach is somewhat distinct, however, because it combines the attitudinal
approach with a complementary account of judicial review as a form of error correction.
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Though such an approach is admittedly stylized, its simplicity enables us
to analyze the most intuitively compelling characteristics of a problem and
to study their mutual interaction.
A. Framework and Fundamentals
1. Description of the Players and Regulatory Environment
Consider a decision-making hierarchy consisting of two players. The first
is denoted by H (representing the "High Court," or perhaps a court
reviewing an administrative agency, or possibly even a legislative body
attempting to legislate around a judicial opinion). The second player is
denoted by L (representing, respectively, the "Low Court," or an adminis-
trative agency, or possibly a unitary court system). These two players
jointly interact in a strategic, hierarchical choice mechanism (described at
greater length below), the "outcome" of which determines the content of
a legal, public, or regulatory policy.
We conceive of the ultimate outcome as some choice that can be repre-
sented by a single point y that lies somewhere along the real number line.
The precise interpretation of y is left purposely general, but for the sake of
discussion (and to motivate a subsequent application of our model), suppose
that y represents the degree of contractual autonomy accorded to market
participants over the selection of passive restraints for passenger vehicles.9
Under this interpretation, y = -- c would represent "no autonomy" for
buyers and sellers (or, equivalently, extreme regulation and requirements
for passive restraint equipment), y = -c would represent "infinite auton-
omy" (or no regulation whatsoever), and intermediate values would repre-
sent proportionally intermediate degrees of autonomy.'0
Players L and H must sequentially make a binary policy choice between
two options: the status quo ante state of the law and a "new" regulation.
In particular, suppose that yo denotes the spatial location of "current law"
as dictated by a status quo, and yi denotes the "new" law (such as an ad-
ministrative policy, executive order, statute, or electoral initiative). The lo-
cational values of the status quo ante and new proposal are assumed to be
common knowledge among the players. Moreover, we shall suppress the
mechanism by which these two choices are put on the agenda, noting for
See Section liA infra.
0 It might seem more natural to conceive of Y as the intensity of regulation, so that y -
would represent "no regulation" and y = oo would represent extreme regulation. We
have chosen the opposite conception, however, merely for descriptive ease. Given that the
desire for regulation is more frequently associated with the political Left, and that y = --
corresponds to the extreme left of the regulatory space Y, our ordering in fact provides a
more natural analogy to the political spectrum.
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now that this is a common constraint in legal decision making. 1 In order
to explore a particular numerical example, however, we will assume in the
text that follows that Yo = - 1 and y, = 1. In terms of the ongoing concep-
tual example, then, the proposed shift from Yo to y, represents a "deregula-
tory" change, in the same spirit as the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration's 1982 decision to rescind a motor vehicle safety standard
requiring automobiles to be equipped with "passive restraints," such as au-
tomatic seatbelts or airbags.12
The players, acting in sequence, rule on the validity of the proposed
change from yo to Yi. Player L is assumed to have no choice whether to
review the new regulation (that is, L must hear out a challenge if made). 3
Once L has heard the case, she issues a holding-denoted hereafter by yL_
representing overturning or upholding the new law, respectively. (Note that
yL must equal either Yo or yI, since these are the only two choices available
to L.) Player H, on the other hand, is less constrained. After L moves, H
observes yL and is given the option to review L's holding. The strategies
available to H at this point are binary, consisting of either a decision to
review L's decision (that is, "grant" certification) or a decision to abstain
from reviewing ("deny" certification). 4 Note that H need not take a "sym-
metric" approach to auditing: She might, for instance, decide to grant certi-
fication only if L overturns Yo, but not otherwise. In fact, the process of
auditing is not a cheap one and may impose costs on H. For the purposes
of our example, we shall suppose that it can cost anywhere between $0 and
$1 for H to audit L's holding and that the precise realization of this cost
distributed uniformly between $0 and $1.15
1 The choice of appropriate value for Y, is itself an interesting stage that might precede
this model. One could imagine a legislature with its own preferences trying to come up with
a law that would pass muster in the court system. Certainly, the outcome of this game will
provide an indication as to which laws would survive relative to yo. We hope to pursue this
question in greater detail in subsequent work.
12 See Section IA infra. The precise values of yo and Yi are not absolutely critical from
a qualitative perspective.
"3 We motivate this assumption based on the stylized fact that initial fact finders (such
as trial courts and administrative agencies) generally have no choice about hearing liti-
gants' arguments, with players further up in the hierarchy enjoying substantially more dis-
cretion about whether to revisit the issue (and with what intensity to do so). We conjecture
the effects of making player L's decision to collect information endogenous at Section IIC
infra.
14 We recognize that for some H/L pairings (such as federal district courts and circuit
courts), H's decision of whether to hear an appeal is not discretionary. However, even in
these situations the intensity of review exercised by the appellate court may be subject to
considerable discretion. For just such an example, see Section I1A infra.
15 Explicitly, H is assumed to know the realization of her reviewing cost at the time she
makes her own auditing decision, but all that L knows about H's auditing cost when issuing
her initial decision is its uniform probability distribution. The assumption that the costs to
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Nevertheless, should H decide to audit L, she will be permitted to hear
the case again and then to issue her own holding-denoted hereafter by
yH-that is assumed to trump L's. Equivalently, the final legal policy that
emerges at the end of the game is yH should H audit and yL should H ab-
stain.
2. Judicial Preferences
The judicial decision makers within this model care about two things.
First, they are interested in effecting an ultimate legal outcome that is as
consistent as possible with their own policy preferences, given their ideol-
ogy and any empirical information about the world that is available. Sec-
ond, the players wish to avoid bearing the administrative costs of reviewing
others' decisions. 6 To this end, then, we shall suppose that each of L and
H attempts to minimize the expected sum of (1) the expected squared dis-
tance 7 between the final legal outcome yF and their respective "ideal
points" and (2) any administrative costs they personally bear in reviewing
a decision from below. 18
The term "ideal point" has a special connotation in our analysis. In par-
ticular, we assume that each player's most-preferred outcome in y-space de-
pends on an existing (and potentially verifiable) 9 state of the world. From
a practical standpoint, the state of the world could represent any empirical
determination that is relevant to a subsequent policy choice by judges.
review lie uniformly between $0 and $1 is a simplifying one. In the Appendix, we present
a more general framework in which the cost of auditing (interpretable as an opportunity cost)
is given by c E C [0, oo), with associated distribution function G(c). Additionally, it is
possible for the lower court to face an "embarrassment" cost of having been reversed. We
suppress this added assumption (for now) to concentrate on the central intuitions of our anal-
ysis, but revisit it again (conjecturing how it would affect our conclusions) at Section IIC
infra.
16 In order to conduct any analysis of judicial behavior within the sequential framework
described above, one must first specify how judges evaluate various legal outcomes. Within
a game-theoretic framework, it is thus important to make some assumption about what the
actors in this model attempt to "maximize" in making their decisions. To be sure, this ques-
tion is the subject of significant current debate, but that debate is largely beyond our ken for
current purposes. For an even more comprehensive list of judicial concerns than those em-
ployed here (and review of the literature), see Richard A. Posner, Overcoming Law 108-44
(1995).
17 The distance function utilized is for mathematical convenience, as we have no good
intuitions about the exact shape of this function (other than it is increasing as y moves away
from the player's ideal point).
"S Quite obviously, the second consideration is only relevant for player H, since player L
cannot avoid having to decide on a given case. See note 13 supra.
19 We say "potentially" because the verifiability of the state of the world depends on the
precision with which adjudicating players can measure it, a question taken up at greater
length below.
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FIGURE 1.-Prior density of the state of the world (X)
Thus, borrowing from the example above, the state of the world might em-
body scientific evidence about the marginal net benefits of increasing the
autonomy of market participants over the selection of safety restraints in
passenger vehicles. To simplify matters, we shall assume that the relevant
characteristics of the state of the world can be represented by a one-
dimensional random variable X, whose realized value x could be any point
on the real line between -- c and -.2" Under the interpretation above, then,
x = -- 0 would denote extremely small net benefits of autonomy, while x
= cc would denote the opposite. For analytical simplicity, we shall assume
that both players begin with identical prior beliefs that X is distributed ac-
cording to a normal distribution, with mean 0 and variance 1. Figure 1 de-
picts the classic bell-shaped structure of the standard normal probability
density.2
Given the state of the world, each player's ideal point is assumed to be
governed by a correspondence between a realized state of the world (that
is, x) and a legal outcome (y). This correspondence, of course, might differ
among the players according to their ideology. In our motivating example,
for instance, players who place relative high a priori value on personal lib-
erty would require a fairly strong evidentiary showing to convince them
20 More formally, we assume that x E X -- 91.
2! In the Appendix, we present a more general framework in which the priors on X are
assumed normal with mean gt and variance li/t, so that the precision of the players' prior
beliefs on X is simply t. The qualitative results below are fully generalizable to that frame-
work. In fact, this framework even lends itself to the analysis of an "ignorant" prior: which
corresponds to a limiting distribution in which T -4 0. Although the prior distribution on X
is not well defined for this limiting case, the posterior distributions may well be. See Morris
H. DeGroot, Optimal Statistical Decisions 190-98 (1970).
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Y
Yl = 1
IL's Ideal Point
Correspondence (y = x + 1)
H's Ideal Point
Correspondence (y = x)
FIGURE 2.-H's and L's ideal point correspondences (E = 1)
that requiring safety restraints at the cost of constraining individual auton-
omy is worthwhile. Other players who value safety, on the other hand,
might require analogously strong evidence to convince them that the rela-
tive dangers in constraining autonomy are large. We attempt to capture the
intuition behind these interpretive differences by assuming that player H
(whom we shall treat as a baseline player) possesses an ideology that is
completely "centrist." That is, if the state of the world were equal to x,
H's ideal law would simply set y = x. In contrast, we assume L's ideal
point is represented by x + 0, where 0 is a parameter reflecting L's ideol-
ogy relative to H. Note that if 0 > 0, L's ideal point is uniformly higher
(more libertarian) than H's for every possible state of the world. Such a
situation is captured in Figure 2 for the special case of 0 = 1, indicating a
situation in which L is more reticent than is H to constrain individual auton-
omy through regulation. Note from the figure that if the state of the world
were x = 1, then player H's ideal law would also be y = 1, but that L's
ideal point would be even higher (that is, less regulatory) than H's, at y =
2. Conversely, if 0 < 0, L's ideal point is uniformly lower (more regula-
tory) than H's for every possible realization of facts.22
22 The differential mapping from x into y is, of course, tantamount to asserting that the
two players differ in how they interpret known facts x.
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3. Informational Environment
The above details describe each player's preference correspondence be-
tween "facts" and "law," but conditional upon knowing the true state of
the world. Such information, however, is generally not easy to come by,
which (in our minds) provides a principal rationale for having a court hear
a case-that is, to receive some more refined information about the existing
state of the world. Within the context of our model, then, the process of
hearing a case is tantamount to receiving a signal (albeit possibly a noisy
one) about the true state of the world. The precise characteristics of these
signals are detailed below.
When L hears a case, she observes a signal, which we shall represent
with a random variable, Z. We shall suppose that L's signal is not fully
informative, in that it consists of the true state of the world plus some addi-
tional "noise." In particular, Z is drawn from a normal distribution with a
mean precisely equal to the true state of the world, x, and variance equal to
1/,y - 0, so that the precision of L's signal is y > 0. Note that implicit in
this definition (though not critical) is an assumption that L receives an unbi-
ased signal of the facts. Of greater importance here is the precision parame-
ter y, which represents a measure of L's accuracy when adjudicating the
facts. If y is close to zero, player L receives a somewhat uninformative sig-
nal about the world. Conversely, as y grows arbitrarily large, the accuracy
of L's signal grows accordingly.
In contrast to L, player H's decision comes in two stages: H must first
decide whether to review L's decision, and then she must rule on the merits
should she decide to audit. In making the former decision, we assume that
H may observe only L's final decision, yL (making whatever inferences she
can from L's decision). Should H decide to audit, however, she will be able
to review the lower court's evidentiary record, thereby observing the real-
ization of Z directly. Additionally, the process of auditing gives H access
to a second signal, V, which is assumed to be normally distributed indepen-
dent of Z, with mean x and precision a -- 0. The intuitive interpretation of
V is that it embodies additional information that is sometimes at the dis-
posal of a reviewing entity (in the form of the parties' appellate briefs,
amici briefs, additional questioning, and the like). The parameter Y can be
interpreted as H's marginal accuracy advantage over L. As a gets close to
zero, H's decision is not significantly better informed than L's (though, of
course, political differences may dictate a different ideal point for the same
signal). However, as Y grows large, H's knowledge about the state of the
world becomes increasingly more informed than L's.
As noted above, H's cost of auditing is unobservable to L at the time she
renders her decision. This could be either because it is privately known by
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FIGURE 3.-Sequence of moves for judicial auditing game
H or (more plausibly) because when L makes her decision, neither party
knows the next period's workload of H, which directly affects H's opportu-
nity cost associated with hearing this case.3 The precise sequence of the
interaction between L and H is represented in Figure 3.
B. Equilibrium Behavior
With the framework of the model fully specified, we now proceed to con-
sider the "equilibrium" behavior of the respective players. In order to
avoid an overly technical and tedious analysis of this framework (which is
beyond the scope of this paper), we shall concentrate on a few questions
that bear directly on the relationship between the relative imprecision of L
and ideological differences between H and L. In particular, we are inter-
ested in the principal determinants of both the auditing and reversal rate
exhibited by H. For readers who are somewhat uninterested in the equilib-
rium description, our primary insights are as follows:
1. Player H will tend to audit L for one of two reasons: (1) ideological
differences between L and H (embodied by a value of 0 that differs from
zero) and (2) imprecision of L relative to H (embodied by a value of a that
differs from zero).
2. When imprecision dominates ideology as a reason for auditing, H will
tend to engage in a two-sided review strategy, in which the rates of auditing
and reversal are qualitatively similar regardless of whether L's decision fa-
vors yo or yi.
3. When ideology dominates imprecision as a reason for auditing, H will
tend to engage in a one-sided review strategy, in which H audits only those
23 The realized opportunity cost of reviewing a case might be interpreted as the shadow
value on a binding constraint that H faces limiting it to hearing some fixed number of cases.
See McNollgast, supra note 7. Under this interpretation, H's workload is assumed exoge-
nous; although particularly productive lower courts or collusion among lower courts might
make H's workload endogenous, we do not examine such possibilities here.
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decisions that are consistent with L's ideological leanings, and not those
that are inconsistent with them.
4. Because a difference in ideology saves H from having to audit at least
one type of L's decisions, in certain (though not all) circumstances H may
review an ideological adversary's opinions less often than those of an ideo-
logical clone. An interesting consequence of this last observation is that an
ideologically diverse judiciary at the lower levels may play a cost-saving
role in administering a judicial auditing system.
To best illustrate these arguments, we find it most convenient to consider
a number of special cases of the framework described above. First, we will
consider the case in which the sole reason for auditing is to correct for L's
relative imprecision because there are no ideological differences between H
and L. Second, we will consider the case in which the sole reason for audit-
ing is to respond to ideological differences because H has no informational ad-
vantage over L. Finally, we will compare a few cases in which both impre-
cision and ideological differences provide H with rationale for reviewing L.
Case 1: Auditing for "Pure Imprecision" (0 = 0; a "Large" Relative
to y). Consider first the case in which H's motivation to review L ema-
nates solely from superior information about the world and not from ideo-
logical differences. In terms of the parameters of the model above, this case
corresponds to a situation where 0 = 0, but a is "large." 24 For ease of
explanation, suppose in particular that y = 1/2 and a = 1. In such an envi-
ronment, what equilibrium strategies will the players exhibit?
Before answering this question numerically, it seems prudent first to at
least attempt to answer it intuitively, keeping in mind the respective play-
ers' information at the time that each acts. Recall that the signals received
by L and H are informative indications about the existing state of the world.
Moreover, the parties' signals are positively correlated with the underlying
state of the world, so that the larger the respective player's signal, the
stronger the evidentiary case for favoring y, over Yo (regardless of the play-
ers' respective ideologies). Using this intuition, one would guess that L
would be more likely to support the new regulation (yl) when she observes
a relatively high signal (z) and, conversely, would tend to prefer the status
quo ante (y0) when she observes a relatively low signal. The same can be
said for H, at least in those situations where H audits L's opinion: only
when the combined signals observed by H (that is, z and v) are sufficiently
high will H will tend to favor the new regulation, and not otherwise.
24 It is important to note that a need not be larger than y, only that it be positive. Recall
that since an auditing H is assumed to observe both L's signal z and her own signal v, a
measures H's advantage in precision over and above L's, and thus whenever a > 0, H has
an informational advantage over L.
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TABLE 1
EQUILIBRIUM STRATEGIES FOR PLAYERS H AND L: PURE IMPRECISION
Player and Action Equilibrium Strategy
L's holding (y') Uphold (yL = = 1) whenever z : 0
Strike down (yL =y = - 1) whenever z < 0
H's auditing rate Audit yj (yL = 1) 18% of the time
Audit Yo (yL = - 1) 18% of the time
H's holding (yH) if H audits Uphold (yH Yi = 1) whenever 1hz + v >- 0
Strike down (yH yo - 1) whenever /2z + v < 0
The equilibrium strategies of the parties in the "pure imprecision" case
are specified in Table 1. Note from the table that L's and H's strategies
correspond well with the intuitions developed above. Indeed, L (the first
mover) will base her holding solely on the content of her signal, z, and its
position relative to her equilibrium "cut point" at z = 0. When z is nega-
tive, L will favor the status quo; when z is positive, L will favor the new
regulation. This seems a sensible strategy on intuitive grounds, since L
shares the same ideology as H and she (like H) begins with prior beliefs
that give her no strong ex ante preference between the status quo and the
new regulation. After learning the value of z, however, L can make a more
refined deduction about whether the true state of the world (x) is closer to
Yo = -1 or to y I 1 and will fashion her holding accordingly.
In deciding whether to audit L's opinion, H may take some solace from
knowing that L shares a common ideology and, thus, employs a similar
decision-making heuristic (albeit with more limited information)." Conse-
quently, H will tend audit only if the expected value of the additional infor-
mation is equal to or exceeds the costs of auditing. Given L's strategy, H
is indifferent between auditing L and abstaining when her realized cost of
auditing is approximately $0.18. Thus, viewed from the ex ante perspective,
the probability that H audits either type of holding is 18 percent.26
Finally, should H decide to audit L, she will learn the content of not only
25 Importantly, if player H adopted an asymmetric auditing policy, the shared ideologies
among the players might actually provide L with a perverse incentive to choose the holding
that is most likely to be reviewed, no matter what her signal may be. The intuition behind
this behavior is that L cares only about the expected distance between the final legal outcome
and her ideal point, and H must privately bear the cost of collecting the additional signal
about x. Player L may therefore have an incentive to free ride off of H's efforts, at least if
L faces no embarrassment costs associated with reversal.
26 That is, since the cost of auditing is uniformly distributed on [0, 1], the ex ante probabil-
ity of H auditing is equal to the ex ante probability that her costs are below $0.18. This
numerical figure, and those to follow, are based on a numerical solution to the model speci-
fied here and described in greater detail in the Appendix.
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L's realized signal (z) but also an independent signal (v) that adds greater
precision to her inference about the state of the world. Like L, H will base
her decision on the content of her information but in this case will form a
composite of the two available signals in order to determine an outcome.
Note that the composite signal is simply the sum of the two signals H ob-
serves, weighted by their respective levels of precision. Thus, H's observa-
tion of v will receive twice the weight as her observation of z. Conse-
quently, the (unconditional) probability that H reverses L is also symmetric
and equal to approximately 3.3 percent.
Before moving on, there are a few qualitative features of the "pure im-
precision" case that bear emphasis. First, note that when the dominant rea-
son for auditing is L's imprecision (rather than ideology), player H will
tend to adopt a two-sided auditing procedure, in which she is equally likely
to review a decision to uphold the new regulation as she is to review a deci-
sion striking it down.27 Moreover, not only is the auditing rate symmetric,
but it also is positively related to the informational advantage that H has
over L (embodied by ;). Thus, for example, if H's advantage were smaller
than that depicted in the table (such as Y = 1/2), then the ex ante auditing
rate would fall to less than 5 percent and the ex ante probability of reversal
would analogously fall to less than 1 percent. Conversely, if H's advantage
were significantly larger (such as a = 2), then the auditing rate would in-
crease to around 36 percent and the reversal rate would likewise increase
to approximately 6.7 percent.
Case 2: Auditing for "Pure Ideology" (0 0; a "Small" Relative to y).
Now consider the case in which H's motivation to review L emanates solely
from a divergent ideology and not from L's relative imprecision. In terms
of our model, this case corresponds to a situation where 0 # 0 and a is
relatively "small." For the purposes of illustration, suppose in particular
that 0 = 1 (so that L has a more deregulatory ideology than does H), y =
1/2, and a = 0. In such an environment, what equilibrium strategies will
the players exhibit?
Once again, it seems prudent first to explore intuitively how the players
would respond to such an environment. Even though the parties' ideologies
differ, it is still the case that both L and H would more likely tend to sup-
port the new regulation (Yi) when they each observe high signals and would
tend to prefer the status quo ante (Yo) when they observe low signals. The
only difference in this case, however, is that L has a decidedly more
27 One small caveat deserves mention here: the two-sided auditing strategy adopted by H
is accentuated when (as in this example) the two possible outcomes (Yo and Yi) are equally
preferable on a priori grounds. Nevertheless, even when such a condition fails to hold, our
qualitative account of the equilibria presists (with some modifications).
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TABLE 2
EQUILIBRIUM STRATEGIES FOR PLAYERS H AND L: PURE IDEOLOGY
Player and Action Equilibrium Strategy
L's holding (yL) Uphold (yL = = 1) whenever z - -2.9
Strike down (yL Yo = -1) whenever z < -2.9
H's auditing rate Audit yj (yL = 1) 65% of the time
Audit Yo (yL = - 1) 0% of the time
H's holding (yH) if H audits Uphold (yH y= 1) whenever z 2t 0
Strike down (yH = Yo = -1) whenever z < 0
autonomy-oriented ideology than does H. As such, it would take a signifi-
cantly stronger factual case against personal autonomy to convince L that
yo is preferable to yl. Moreover, because L is a "harder sell" on regulatory
stances than is her counterpart H, one could easily imagine that knowledge
of these differences would likewise affect H's auditing strategy, since H
would reasonably perceive L's holding as a biased distortion of the signal
L observed.
The equilibrium strategies of the parties in the "pure ideology" case are
specified in Table 2. Once again, L's and H's equilibrium strategies corre-
spond well with the intuitions developed above. Indeed, L will favor the
(regulatory) status quo ante only if the evidence from the case strongly sup-
ports regulation (z < -2.9). Otherwise, L will tend to support the deregula-
tory option.
L's ideological bent provides an interesting strategic tool for H in decid-
ing whether to audit L's opinion. In particular, it allows H to pursue a one-
sided auditing strategy. She will never choose to audit a decision by L that
favors the status quo ante (yo). H's decision not to audit such a holding is
perfectly sensible and stems from the following reasoning: "L's holding
tells me that she observed a signal that was sufficiently convincing to over-
come her own penchant for autonomy. Since I am much more sympathetic
to proregulatory policies, and since auditing will yield no more information
to me than that which L possessed when making her decision, it is clear
that I should not review this decision.' 28
By the reverse reasoning, L's relative ideology will make H even more
28 For the pop culture cognoscenti, the reasoning described in the text is much akin to
that of the 1970s-era television commercials starring the extraordinarily finicky child named
"Mikey," purported to hate everything. In each commercial, Mikey's clever brothers ex-
ploited their younger sibling's discriminating tastes by using him to screen among new break-
fast cereals, correctly reasoning that "if Mikey likes it, we'll all like it a fortiori." (It is
unlikely that Mikey's siblings were actually conversant in pretentious phrases like "a forti-
ori," but the take-away message was nonetheless the same.)
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TABLE 3
A COMPARISON OF EXPECTED AUDIT AND REVERSAL RATES (%)
Pure Imprecision Mixed Motive Pure Imprecision
Expected (0 = 0, y= .5,,a = 1) (0 =.25,y=.5, a = 1) (0 = 0,y=. 2 , a = 1)
Rate (1) (2) (3)
Audit 18 15 23
Reversal 3.3 4.8 5.1
suspicious when L issues a holding that supports the new deregulatory pol-
icy yI. Indeed, H will be unsure whether L issued such a holding on account
of a strong signal or because L's ideological proclivities caused her to inter-
pret an otherwise weak signal in a biased fashion. Consequently, then, a
decision by L to uphold the new regulation will be extremely susceptible
to review by H: 65 percent likely, in this example.
Finally, when H decides to audit, she will base her opinion solely on the
content of the same signal that was observed by L, since in this case H is
assumed to have no informational advantage over L. Thus, when z < 0, H
will favor the status quo; when z > 0, H will favor the new regulation. All
told, the expected rate of reversal for this case is approximately 26 percent,
a rate that tends to grow as the ideological differences between H and L
widen.
Case 3: Auditing for "Mixed Motives" (0 # 0; a "Large" Relative
to "). The previous two cases describe how either relative imprecision or
relative political bias can create incentives for H to audit's L's decisions. It
is also possible to explore what happens when both incentives exist. Doing
so, however, does not substantially affect the intuitions illustrated above. In
particular, when both imprecision and ideology exist, H's auditing decision
will tend to respond to the most dominant effect. Thus, for example, if one
slightly alters case 1, so that y = 1/2, and a = 1, but 0 takes on a positive
but relatively small value such as .05, the equilibrium strategies change
slightly (but not dramatically) in the direction of one-sided auditing. Rather
than employ symmetric auditing at a frequency of 18 percent, H will now
audit a yo holding 13 percent of the time but will audit a Yi at a 23 percent
rate. This behavior still constitutes two-sided auditing, but it is becoming
increasingly asymmetric and moving in the direction of the exclusive one-
sided auditing strategy discussed in case 2.
Perhaps of greater interest is the question of how ideological differences
affect auditing and reversal rates. Although one's intuition is that ceteris
paribus, greater ideological differences should be reflected in greater rates
of review and reversal, this need not always be the case. For example, Table
3 compares (1) "pure imprecision" as per case 1, (2) a small variation of
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case 1 in which L has slightly antiregulatory proclivity of 0 = .25, and (3)
a different version of the pure-imprecision case in which the precision of
L's signal is y = 0.2.
Consider first the comparison of columns 1 and 2, which differ only the
ideology parameter 0 (with L having a slight deregulatory bias in column
2). Although the reversal rate is as one's intuition might suggest, the ex-
pected audit rate for column 2 is in fact lower than that of column 1, even
with relative precision levels held constant. This lower rate of review re-
flects a potential benefit of a one-sided auditing regime, in which H need
audit only one type of decision by L. In order to implement such a regime,
however, it is necessary for L to have an ideology that is distinct from H's.
To the extent that H's workload makes it difficult for her to audit all cases,
the comparison of columns 1 and 2 suggests that political differences be-
tween L and H may serve to economize on the frequency of audits. More-
over, as a comparison of columns 2 and 3 illustrates, H may both audit and
reverse a relatively accurate (though politically distinct) L less often than
she would one whose ideological bent was closer to H's but who was rela-
tively inaccurate. Once again, this comparison suggests that there are some
plausible situations in which some "diversity" in the political ideology of
lower-echelon actors may be beneficial to those further up in the decision-
making hierarchy.29
Moreover, these observations suggest that attempts to measure empiri-
cally the role of ideology within the judiciary should exercise caution in
interpreting the relationship between politics and judicial review. As noted
above, it is tempting to think that observed review and reversal rates are a
reliable proxy for ideological differences between lower- and upper-echelon
judicial actors.3" As this discussion demonstrates, however, empirical
auditing and reversal rates need not bear a systematic relationship to politi-
cal differences when there is variable precision within lower courts."'
C. Robustness
The analysis above has made a number of simplifying assumptions on
the structure of the game in order to underscore the principal intuitions of
29 It is important to qualify this conclusion in at least two respects. First, only moderate
amounts of diversity within lower courts can have the economizing effects described in the
text. Indeed, if the lower court were an "ideologue" (for example, 0 = -), then the holding
issued by L would provide a completely uninformative signal to H. Second, even when H's
ideology corresponds with that of society at large, it need not follow that maximizing H's
welfare equates to maximizing society's, since the holding issued by H is a public good while
the costs of auditing are borne privately by H. Hence, it is possible for judicial diversity to
be good for H but actually bad for society.
3 See, for example, Cross & Tiller, supra note 8.
s This discussion is taken up again in Section IIIB infra.
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our model. While such simplifications are common to all applied models,
it is nonetheless important to explore whether the model's results are robust
to variations in these assumptions. Before moving on to our principal appli-
cations, then, we briefly comment on two such variations, conjecturing how
they would affect our results.
First, our analysis has thus far assumed that if H audits and reverses L's
holding, L incurs no detriment over and above the "indirect" costs she suf-
fers from a (potentially) less desirable outcome in the case. In some (though
perhaps not all) contexts, however, a reversal by H can impose nontrivial
direct costs on L, such as damage to one's reputation or simple dignitary
harm. The exclusion of direct reversal costs such as these from our model
probably biases our results in the direction of overstating the starkness of
one-sided auditing. To understand why, consider an extreme case of pure
ideological differences, in which L suffers a cost from reversal that is ex-
tremely large relative to other parameters in the model.32 In such an in-
stance, player L will tend to care principally about minimizing the probabil-
ity she is audited and overruled; the ideological differences with H are now
unimportant. Consequently, L's equilibrium behavior will tend to ignore
such ideological differences, and L will decide the instant case as if she
possessed H's preferences. Indeed, if L's equilibrium strategy prescribed
deciding the case in a manner more consistent with her own ideology, H's
best response would be to utilize an asymmetric monitoring strategy, re-
viewing only those decisions that are consistent with L's political leanings.
Predicting this response, L would have an incentive to issue holdings that
are contrary to her ideological preferences, which, in turn, would lead H to
adopt the opposite one-sided auditing strategy, and so on, ad infinitum. This
cycling behavior suggests that the only plausible equilibrium in the case of
large direct reversal costs entails L adopting H's preferences to decide the
case and H engaging in symmetric, two-sided auditing. In less extreme
cases, of course (for example, where the relative direct costs of reversal are
moderate or small), L's greater tolerance for reversals will lead to an inter-
mediate sort of equilibrium, where H's auditing strategy is qualitatively
two-sided but substantively stacked against those holdings that are consis-
tent with L's relative ideology. Thus, the introduction of direct reversal
costs will tend to dampen the predicted differences between pure ideology
and pure imprecision, but it will not eliminate these differences so long as
these direct costs do not swamp other concerns.
Second, our analysis assumed that player L had no choice but to hear a
case while player H had complete discretion about whether to bear the costs
32 In particular, suppose that 0 # 0, a is small relative to y, and L suffers a direct cost of
if H audits and overturns L's holding, where P is positive and arbitrarily large.
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of auditing. While such an assumption is probably justified in many in-
stances, there may well be others where L has some discretion about
whether to expend any effort in hearing a case. Such a variation, however,
seems unlikely to nullify our original intuitions and may sometimes even
amplify them. Consider, for example, an extreme case in which L and H
differ only by ideology but L faces an arbitrarily large cost of effort in hear-
ing a case. In such a circumstance, L will never choose to expend effort
and will simply issue a holding based only on her ex ante information about
x. Knowing that H's realized cost of auditing may sometimes be prohibi-
tive, in equilibrium a rational L would issue the holding that comports best
with her ex ante inclinations and ideology. Even though H may audit such
a holding (now perhaps even more frequently than before), there is at least
a chance that she will not, and taking such a gamble can often be more
attractive than the alternative of issuing the opposite holding and having it
stand. At the very least, then, the introduction of endogenous effort by L
may complicate the intuitions above, but it need not reverse them.
III. APPLICATIONS
The example from the previous section suggests some interesting predic-
tions about auditing behavior among upper-echelon judicial actors. Most
notably, it predicts an auditing strategy that can be either even-handed or
asymmetric, depending on whether the dominant reason for reviewing is
(respectively) imprecision or ideology. In this section, we use these intu-
itions to provide an interpretation of judicial behavior in a number of spe-
cific cases, and we posit its relevance for more general theories of adju-
dication.
A. One-Sided Review in Legal Doctrine
The issue of whether courts should apply one-sided or two-sided review
of lower-level decision makers sometimes bursts into doctrinal prominence.
Below we consider two examples of such episodes.
Before proceeding, however, one caveat deserves mentions. Both of the
examples explored below involve the review of regulations promulgated by
federal administrative agencies. In each example, the administrative agency
formulates a regulation, which is then challenged in the court of appeals. 3
The court of appeals's decision is then challenged in the Supreme Court.
Thus, it appears that there are three levels of hierarchy, and our model of
two levels does not apply in any straightforward way.
" Such cases are, in general, appealed directly to the court of appeals.
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Nevertheless, there is a way to reconcile our model's results with the in-
stitutional structure of judicial review. To see how, assume first that the
court of appeals is choosing strategically only with respect to the adminis-
trative agency.34 Second, the Supreme Court, when it reviews the case, is
choosing a rule for the court of appeals to apply in subsequent cases of this
sort. When doing so, the Supreme Court is telling the court of appeals to
decide future cases like this in the same way that the Supreme Court would
if it were in the place of the court of appeals.
Such a pair of strategies may not be optimal for a fully rational court of
appeals and Supreme Court. The fully optimal strategies chosen in a three-
level game of hierarchy may differ from the equilibria described in this sec-
tion and may be quite complex.35 Fully specifying and solving such a model
would be quite complicated and lies beyond the scope of our article. But
the descriptions in the examples below can be understood and appreciated
as a boundedly rational implementation of the optimal strategies derived
above. The players have managed to understand and solve the two-level
game of hierarchy-no mean feat by itself-and are doing the best they
can by trying to utilize the two-level strategies in the ways described.36
1. Review of Administrative Decisions
Consider first a recurrent debate from administrative law. When an ad-
ministrative agency promulgates a regulation that is admittedly within the
agency's delegation, the parties subject to the regulation sometimes chal-
lenge the regulation as being "arbitrary or capricious." 37 The federal courts
must then evaluate the regulation. At other times agencies take deregulatory
actions by, for example, rescinding previously adopted regulations. Deregu-
latory actions can also be challenged as being "arbitrary or capricious." A
central issue in such cases is whether courts should apply a more de-
3 This is most likely because the probability of review is so small.
3 See Emerson H. Tiller & Pablo T. Spiller, Strategic Instruments: Legal Structure and
Political Games in Administrative Law, 15 J. L. Econ. & Org. 349 (1999).
36 Completely solving such a model of bounded rationality is beyond the scope of this
paper. There is another possible way to understand the following pair of examples. If the
Supreme Court correctly believes that the court of appeals will follow the Supreme Court's
directions as to any particular class of cases as a fully honest agent, but that the court of
appeals either will not or cannot follow a general direction to "do as I would do in all cases,"
then the discussions in the opinions at the Supreme Court are fully consistent with our model.
The Supreme Court justices can be understood as working out, without our two-level hierar-
chy, the appropriate strategy from their point of view. They then direct the court of appeals
to implement the appropriate strategy. The court of appeals, which is not behaving strategi-
cally with respect to the Supreme Court, works out its own best two-level hierarchical strat-
egy in the cases below.
37 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1999).
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manding, less demanding, or equally demanding standard when evaluating
deregulatory actions by administrative agencies, as compared to the stan-
dard applied to regulatory actions by the same agencies.
The Supreme Court directly faced this issue in Motor Vehicle Manufac-
turers' Association v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company.38
In State Farm, the Court evaluated the Reagan-era National Highway Traf-
fic Safety Administration's (NHTSA) decision to rescind a motor vehicle
safety standard that had required that all automobiles produced after 1982 be
equipped with "passive restraints," such as automatic seatbelts or airbags.
Because NHTSA's action was deregulatory, the Court had to consider
the parties' contentions that the appropriate standard of review was differ-
ent from that for regulatory action. In an opinion by Abner Mikva (a Demo-
crat often perceived as a political liberal), the court of appeals-after an
extensive examination of the legislative history of the acts involved (and
considerable handwringing) 39-finally concluded that it must review the re-
scission of a safety standard more closely than a promulgation of a safety
standard. Put differently, the court of appeals showed less deference to the
deregulatory action than it would to a regulatory action. In complete con-
trast, the NHTSA argued that rescission of a safety standard deserved less
intense review (and hence more deference) from the reviewing court than
the promulgation of a safety standard. Both the court of appeals's and
NHTSA's suggested standards are relatively one-sided review strategies.
The Supreme Court, in an opinion by the moderate Justice White, rejected
both suggestions and chose a two-sided review strategy. In other words, un-
der the Court's opinion, the same standard should apply evenhandedly to
both regulatory and deregulatory actions:
Unlike the Court of Appeals, we do not find the appropriate scope of judicial review
to be the "most troublesome question" in these cases.... The agency's action in
promulgating such standards therefore may be set aside if found to be "arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." . . .
We believe that the rescission or modification of an occupant-protection standard
is subject to the same test.
Petitioner Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association (MVMA) disagrees, con-
tending that the rescission of an agency rule should be judged by the same standard
a court would use to judge an agency's refusal to promulgate a rule in the first
place-a standard petitioner believes considerably narrower than the traditional ar-
bitrary-and-capricious test. We reject this view. ... [T]here is no more reason to
presume that changing circumstances require the rescission of prior action, instead
of a revision in or even the extension of current regulation. If Congress established
a presumption from which judicial review should start, that presumption-contrary
38 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
19 680 F.2d 206, 222, 228 (1982).
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to petitioners' views-is not against safety regulation, but against changes in cur-
rent policy that are not justified by the rulemaking record. While the removal of a
regulation may not entail the monetary expenditures and other costs of enacting a
new standard, and, accordingly, it may be easier for an agency to justify a deregula-
tory action, the direction in which an agency chooses to move does not alter the
standard of judicial review established by law.'
The intuitions from the strategic analysis in the previous section animate
an interesting interpretation of this judicial debate over standards of review.
Indeed, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (and most
other executive branch administrative agencies under the Reagan adminis-
tration) was extremely conservative. Judge Mikva, writing for the court of
appeals, had been a liberal Democratic member of Congress before being
appointed to the D.C. Circuit. At the same time, it is unlikely that the court
of appeals had much of an informational advantage over the NHTSA in ob-
serving and interpreting automobile safety data. Under such an arrange-
ment-where ideological differences dominate concerns over impreci-
sion-we would expect one-sided auditing, in which Judge Mikva would
be inclined to engage in a rigorous review of only deregulatory actions, but
not regulatory ones.4 The Supreme Court, by comparison to Judge Mikva,
was much more conservative. As a consequence, the Supreme Court's poli-
tics were fairly closely aligned with those of NHTSA. This is precisely
where our model suggests that a two-sided auditing strategy by H is more
likely.
Viewed thusly, the Supreme Court's opinion can be understood as a di-
rection to the court of appeals to utilize a two-sided approach in review
of administrative regulations that are grounded in solid expertise when the
regulations are challenged as arbitrary and capricious. Although the Su-
preme Court's instruction may or may not be the best, fully rational strategy
in a three-level hierarchy, it appears to be an acceptable boundedly rational
strategy-solving the two-level game and then telling the agent that he will
be expected to perform in accord with the optimal strategy for the principal.
2. Equal Protection Doctrine
The tension over one-sided or two-sided auditing has also surfaced in the
law of equal protection. All members of the Supreme Court appear to agree
10 463 U.S. at 42.
"' To be precise, our model requires knowledge of both the precision of the lower level
as well as the relative politics of the lower and the appellate level. One could argue that the
NHTSA, by virtue of expertise, is likely to be precise in its technical predictions. If this is
so, the model's predictions are clearly as described in the paragraph above. If not, the best
we can say is that the doctrinal choices of the courts of appeal and of the Supreme Court are
consistent with our model.
JUDICIAL AUDITING
that racial classifications in laws that harm or disadvantage minority group
members can be constitutional only if the laws pass muster under a "strict
scrutiny" analysis. In Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. Federal Communications
Commission,42 the Supreme Court faced the opposite issue of whether "be-
nign" racial classifications should also garner strict scrutiny or some less
demanding form of review. In Metro, the Federal Communications Com-
mission, with some strong prompting from Congress, had adopted several
programs that gave preferences to racial minorities43 when the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) was awarding broadcasting licenses.'
These policies were considered benign because their purpose, and probably
their effect,45 was to aid minority group members.
The majority, consisting of Brennan, Marshall, White, Blackmun, and
Stevens, held that the FCC's policies could be justified by an "important"
governmental interest: "Congress and the FCC have selected the minority
ownership policies primarily to promote programming diversity, and they
urge that such diversity is an important governmental objective that can
serve as a constitutional basis for the preference policies. We agree." ' The
majority also concluded that the challenged policies needed to be "substan-
tially related" to achieving the important governmental interest.47
The dissent, consisting of O'Connor, Rehnquist, Scalia, and Kennedy,
would have applied strict scrutiny evenhandedly to both benign and harmful
racial classifications. Explicitly, the dissent would have required a "com-
pelling" state interest, and the challenged laws needed to have been "nar-
rowly tailored" to achieve the compelling state interest: "To uphold the
challenged programs, the Court departs from these fundamental principles
and from our traditional requirement that racial classifications are permissi-
42 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
43 There were, to a much lesser extent, programs for women.
4 There were four such programs. First, when the FCC awarded most broadcasting sta-
tions it used a "comparative hearing," in which all applicants were compared to one another.
Minority applicants were given extra credit in the comparative hearing. Second, sometimes
the FCC used a lottery to award broadcasting stations. Minority applicants got extra chances.
Third, if a broadcaster sold its license to a minority purchaser, the seller would get a "tax
certificate," which allowed the seller to defer payment of tax on the gain from the sale.
Fourth, sometimes broadcasters arguably violate the FCC's rules and find themselves sched-
uled for a hearing before the FCC on the alleged violations. If, before the hearing, the li-
censee sold the license to a minority purchaser for no more than 75 percent of fair market
value, the purchaser would take free of any violations committed by the seller. 497 U.S. at
557. See generally Matthew L. Spitzer, Justifying Minority Preferences in Broadcasting, 64
S. Cal. L. Rev. 293, 297-302 (1991).
4' See Jeff Dubin & Matthew L. Spitzer, Testing Minority Preferences in Broadcasting,
68 S. Cal. L. Rev. 841 (1995).
46 497 U.S. at 566.
41 Id. at 569.
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ble only if necessary and narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling interest.
This departure marks a renewed toleration of racial classifications and a re-
pudiation of our recent affirmation that the Constitution's equal protection
guarantees extend equally to all citizens." 48
The Metro majority was composed of the five most liberal members of
the court. Four of these members, Brennan, Marshall, Stevens, and Black-
mun, were clearly to the left of both the lower federal courts and the center
of gravity of the U.S. political scene during the Reagan/Bush era. Under
these circumstances our model predicts that one might expect these four
Supreme Court justices to favor one-sided auditing. Liberal choices-be-
nign racial classifications-need gamer only limited review. Conservative
choices-harmful racial classifications-would require much more intense
scrutiny.
The four members in the dissent, O'Connor, Kennedy, Rehnquist, and
Scalia, were quite conservative, and hence were much more in line with the
legislative and administrative bodies that were likely to be creating laws
with racial classifications. In such circumstances, our model predicts that it
is likely49 that the conservative justices will prefer two-sided monitoring.
Applying strict scrutiny to both benign and harmful racial classifications
can be understood as a type of two-sided monitoring.
Justice White, in contrast, is a bit of a puzzle. In a previous case, Rich-
mond v. J.A. Croson Co.,"0 Justice White had apparently opted for two-
sided monitoring, voting with a majority that applied strict scrutiny to all
racial classifications. In Metro, however, Justice White appeared to have a
change of heart and voted (along with the four dissenters from Croson) in
favor of one-sided monitoring. Because Justice White was politically cen-
trist, our model is least able to make predictions about his choice. His
change of heart could have been due to changes in the political environment
or might have been because his own politics drifted to the left.
However, just 5 years later Justice Thomas had replaced Justice White
and, in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,5 the Court reversed its posi-
tion. Adarand involved minority preferences in contracting with the govern-
ment and raised the same issue of benign racial classifications that the Court
had decided (differently) in Croson and Metro. Justice O'Connor wrote for
a majority that included (with minor disagreements, here and there) Rehn-
quist, Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas. The four dissenters were Breyer, Gins-
burg, Stevens, and Souter. The obvious conservative/liberal split produces
48 Id. at 602.
"9 Assuming the appropriate levels of precision are met.
50 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
11 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
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exactly the same result (on a justice-by-justice basis) that it produced in
Croson and Metro.52
Does our model help to predict the same conservative/liberal split in
1995? By 1995, the federal government was controlled by conservative Re-
publicans in the House and Senate and a middle-of-the-road Democratic
president. This probably produces legislation similar to that of a federal
government composed of a conservative Republican president and a Senate
and House controlled by a middle-of-the-road Democratic Party."
State governments are a trickier issue. In 1990 four state governments
were unified Republican,54 29 were split, and 16 were unified Democratic.
By 1995, 12 state governments were unified Republican, 29 were split, and
eight were unified Democratic. 5 The median state government remained
split, and indeed most state governments were under split control. Thus, one
could argue that the political center of gravity in state governments had not
changed substantially from 1990 to 1995. However, there was likely at least
some rightward movement in state governments, since eight state govern-
ments moved from the "unified Democratic" to the "unified Republican"
category. The expected product from a randomly chosen state would there-
fore be somewhat more conservative. 56 Consequently, our model can make
no firm prediction that all judicial attitudes toward auditing would not
change, vis-A-vis state legislation, between 1990 and 1995. We can say,
however, that the liberal justices, all of whom favored intermediate scrutiny
for benign classifications in 1990, should continue to do so in 1995. Ex-
tremely conservative justices who preferred strict scrutiny for benign classi-
fications in 1990 should continue to do so in 1995. Moderately conservative
justices who preferred intermediate scrutiny in 1990 could conceivably have
been moved to prefer strict scrutiny in 1995 by a mild rightward shift in state
politics. These justices might or might not have changed their attitudes.57
52 It should be noted that even after Adarand, if a regulation makes no explicit racial clas-
sifications and is motivated by a desire to help minorities, it may be tested under less than
strict scrutiny. See Ian Ayres, Narrow Tailoring, Symposium on Affirmative Action, 43
UCLA L. Rev. 1781 (1996).
" We are aware that the different roles played by the House and Senate-jointly propos-
ing legislation-and the president-accepting or rejecting proposed legislation-will pro-
duce some difference. However, all three branches must accept changes from the status quo.
Congress was "veto proof" in neither 1990 nor 1995. Hence, differences in legislation pro-
duced was probably small enough to allow our textual analysis to stand.
"Unified Republican control" is defined as the governor and both upper and lower
houses in control of Republicans. "Unified Democratic control" is defined as the governor
and both the upper and lower houses in control of Democrats. "Split" government is any-
thing else. Nebraska is omitted.
" Calculations on file with the authors.
56 We presume the Supreme Court must choose one rule for all states.
7 Again, we presume the right degrees of precision to make the political analysis work.
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We can therefore conclude that the voting on doctrines in Adarand was
entirely consistent with the predictions our model can make. However, our
model cannot make predictions as to every justice regarding the review of
state laws.
B. Empirical Predictions Based on Competence
One may be able to use judicial competence-called precision in our
model-to predict differences in reversal rates: less precise courts should
be reversed more often. This result, while not surprising in and of itself,
should be exacerbated by the monitoring behavior of the higher court. As
the lower court's (or level's) precision falls, the higher court will move to
two-sided auditing.
Ideally, from an empirical standpoint, one would like to be able to ob-
serve directly two-sided auditing or one-sided auditing, on a case-by-case
basis, without the aid of a change in doctrine. If we could do so, and if we
could come up with a proxy for precision, then we could directly test the
prediction. We would, perhaps, regress reversal rates on lower-court preci-
sion, while controlling for politics and other relevant independent variables.
Unfortunately, such an approach is probably unavailable. Indeed, since
"auditing" in our model stands for taking a genuine reexamination of the
record rather than a cursory wave of the hand, it may be difficult to discern,
from the outside, whether the higher court has really "audited" a decision.
As a consequence, it will be difficult to observe whether a court engages in
one-sided or two-sided auditing. This will make it difficult to test directly
the prediction about auditing and precision.
We can, however, posit another prediction with a somewhat more psy-
chological basis. Assume that perceptions about judicial competence are in-
versely related to the empirical rate of reversal. Indeed, as more cases are
audited, more should be reversed. More to the point, holding political dif-
ferences constant, greater imprecision among lower courts will lead both to
more two-sided auditing by higher courts and to higher reversal rates
among audited cases. Consequently, those lower-court judges with reputa-
tions for lack of precision should face higher empirical reversal rates, in
part because higher courts move to two-sided auditing in response to the
reputation.
Furthermore, if the higher reversal rates help reinforce reputation, the
lower-court judge's reputation might well be a self-fulfilling prophecy.
Thus, if a judge starts with a reputation for being precise, one-sided
auditing could produce a low enough reversal rate to sustain this reputation.
Another judge, starting with a reputation for being imprecise, could, as an
artifact of two-sided auditing, compile a high enough reversal rate to sustain
the reputation. The two judges could, in actuality, be equally precise.
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Now, can we find a good proxy for precision? Who would start with a
reputation for being precise, and who would start with a reputation for be-
ing imprecise? We can suggest two possibilities. First, in his book on the
federal courts, Richard Posner suggests that there are different categories of
appointments.58 Some are purely political payoffs. These judges might be
regarded as relatively imprecise. Others are quality appointments. These
judges might be regarded as more precise. They might get "tracked" into
one-sided or two-sided auditing from the start. Holding politics constant,
we would predict higher reversal rates, on average, for "political" ap-
pointees to the bench.
Second, we might be able to utilize American Bar Association (ABA)
ratings of appointees to the bench. The ABA rates nominees as "highly
qualified," "qualified," or "unqualified." If these ratings can serve as
proxies for decreasing levels of precision, we can fashion a second empiri-
cal prediction. Holding politics constant, we would predict higher reversal
rates, on average, for nominees rated "qualified" than for those nominees
rated "highly qualified."
C. Deciding Like Cases Alike
One of the basic principles of Anglo-American jurisprudence is that like
cases should be decided alike. Legal analysts as diverse as Lon Fuller,59
H. L. A. Hart,6" and John Rawls61 regard this principle as central to a system
of law. Law professors teach law students to compare cases and evaluate
them for consistency.62 A court system that fails to treat like cases alike,
runs traditional analysis, should suffer from a harsh critique.
Our analysis suggests that outside observers, such as lawyers, law profes-
sors, journalists, and ordinary citizens, may perceive a lot of failure to treat
like cases alike. Our model predicts that a court of appeals judge will adjust
her review strategy according to her assessment of the lower court's accu-
racy and ideology. This can confound the outsider's interpretation of the
judicial process if the observer is not fully aware of the underlying strategic
contours.
To see how this might work, consider Figure 4. The figure depicts a court
system with two separate circuits, much like a stylized version of our fed-
5 Richard A. Posner, The Federal Courts: Challenge and Reform 13-20 (1996).
9 Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law 39 (rev. ed. 1964) (claiming that the failure to
achieve consistency precludes the existence of law).
60 H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law 155 (1961).
61 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 237 (1971).
62 Steven J. Burton, An Introduction to Law and Legal Reasoning 25-47 (2d ed. 1995).
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x AC2
FIGURE 4.-Like cases need not be treated alike
eral court system. Circuit 1 has a lower court, LC1 , which has liberal ideol-
ogy, and a court of appeals, ACI, which is conservative. (The various
courts' expected ideal points are noted with arrows on the diagram.)63 Cir-
cuit 2 has a lower court, LC 2, which has conservative ideology and a preci-
sion identical to that of LCI, and a court of appeals, AC2, which has a con-
servative ideology identical to AC 1 (and identical precision). The status quo
ante is very liberal, and identical cases come up simultaneously before LC1
and LC 2. The two lower courts choose the identical conservative outcome,
denoted "New Reg" in Figure 4. This is because both LC and LC 2 happen
to draw a very conservative signal, called "z" in Figure 4. The extremely
conservative signal leads even the liberal lower court, LC1 , to choose the
conservative New Reg.
The appellate court in Circuit 1, AC1, may well have adopted one-sided
auditing for LC1 . When the liberal LC issues a conservative decision, the
AC, may not bother to audit the decision, in essence affirming it without
even looking. The appellate court will reason that if a lower court with lib-
eral tendencies chose a conservative outcome, the lower court must have
observed a very conservative signal. Hence, AC, can save its resources and
affirm the conservative outcome without an independent reexamination.
However, LC 2 may well be subjected to two-sided auditing from AC2 in
Circuit 2. When the appellate court in Circuit 2 reviews the case from LC2,
its review of the record may (at least sometimes) convince the appellate
court to reverse the lower court's decision. For example, in Figure 4 we
show what happens if AC 2 reviews LC 2 and gets a liberal signal, called v
in Figure 4. The appellate court, which was able to conclude very little
about the signal received by the conservative LC 2's signal from the choice
63 Recall that the courts may not know their actual idea points when they make a decision,
because such points are contingent on having perfect information about x.
JUDICIAL AUDITING
of the conservative outcome New Reg,' will revise its beliefs when it sees
the liberal signal v. If v is liberal enough, as in Figure 4, AC2 will reverse
LC 2 and reinstate the status quo ante.
An observer, such as a law professor or a newspaper reporter who is
reviewing the cases, will likely read both records-in essence auditing both
of them. If the professor or reporter does not understand the dynamics un-
derlying the two decisions, he or she will tend to embrace the following
standard critique, based upon the rule of law. In particular, the observer will
likely critique the courts of appeals in the two circuits by calling the cases
"inconsistent" and conclude that the cases violate the rule of law. The de-
cisions will not even be reconcilable on standard political grounds-that
conservative judges like to approve only conservative results. Here both de-
cisions were conservative. The observer, casting around for some way to
reconcile the two decisions, may fasten onto the politics of the lower-court
justices. But even here the observer may be frustrated; the two conservative
courts of appeals appear to be punishing the conservative judge and re-
warding the liberal one.
But our analysis suggests that the normative critique may not be right. It
is possible that appellate courts are correct to utilize all the information at
their disposal, including the political preferences of lower courts and the
lower courts' precision, to formulate a review strategy. For this to be true
we would need to believe not only that politics are part of law, but that
we should openly embrace (or at least tolerate) it. We would also need to
acknowledge openly that not all lower-court judges are of equal ability and
that some deserve less "independence" than others.65 Resolving these is-
sues lies well beyond the scope of our paper; but it is, however, worth no-
ticing that there may be a severe conflict between appellate courts' optimal
auditing strategies and the appearance of legitimacy in the pattern of deci-
sions that are approved and reversed.
D. Independence and Accountability
Finally, if one applies our framework to inter- rather than intrabranch
conflict, it may be possible to glean some tentative insights into the current
debate over judicial independence versus accountability. While the U.S.
Constitution mandates formal institutional separation between the federal
judiciary and other branches of government, the precise nature of that sepa-
6 Assume that the appellate courts are not aware of the decisions of trial courts in other
circuits.
65 Even if these propositions about politics and accuracy are true, openly acknowledging
them to be true is a controversial act. See Scott Altman, Beyond Candor, 89 Mich. L. Rev.
296 (1990).
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ration has proven to be somewhat elusive. Indeed, though nominally inde-
pendent, the federal judiciary is frequently hamstrung by a number of for-
mal constraints on its independence and must yield to other branches on
such matters as the creation and regulation of new courts, the appointment
or impeachment of judges, judicial salary increases, and even the prospec-
tive (and sometimes retrospective) modification of judicial decisions. 66 It is
in this sense that the judiciary has been described as simultaneously inde-
pendent of and accountable to other branches of government. Although tal-
ented members of the bench, bar, and legal academy have wrestled with the
enterprise of refining and clarifying these institutional contours, the tension
between independence and accountability remains palpable and largely un-
resolved. 67
To be sure, tensions such as these may simply be part and parcel of a
healthy constitutional democracy, and therefore inevitable. 6 At the same
time, however, such mirthful concessions do little to resolve the ongoing
debate about the existence and magnitude of purported "threats" to judicial
independence. Our analysis suggests that those interested in this debate may
find it fruitful to decompose the possible rationales for external audits of
the judiciary, and only then juxtapose the most likely of these to a norma-
tive account of judicial independence. Suppose, for instance, that one be-
lieved the principal normative justification of judicial independence is to
provide a prophylactic against the dangers of cyclical factional politics-
the so-called countermajoritarian difficulty.69 Under such an account, exter-
nal audits of the judiciary borne of ideological differences might constitute
a bona fide threat, while auditing for imprecision would be substantially
less objectionable. Although distinguishing between these two rationales is
not always easy in practice,7° our arguments suggest that empirical evidence
of one-sided versus two-sided auditing may be a helpful diagnostic proxy.
Thus, if judges were to receive external criticism from only one segment of
the political spectrum, or if the judicial opinions that received substantial
criticism were only those that paddled against the prevailing political cur-
rent, then one might have a strong case for inferring an institutional threat
See note 1 supra.
67 See, for example, ABA Report, supra note 5, at 45 (noting the tension over interbranch
conflict, that it is both "intractable" and "inevitable," and offering little in the way of reso-
lution other than a vague notion of "mutual respect").
68 Id. at 45.
69 See, for example, Alexander Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch 17-21 (2d ed. 1988);
The Federalist No. 10 (Madison).
70 See, for example, The Federalist No. 79 (Hamilton) (rejecting "inability" as a criterion
for impeachment, apparently for fear that it would be susceptible to political opportunism
and abuse).
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to the judiciary. On the other hand, if external criticism were substantially
bipartisan, more evenhanded across judicial opinions, or relatively proce-
dural (rather than substantive),7' interbranch conflict may be not only less
troubling but also normatively appropriate.
E. Further Work
Our framework may allow some useful empirical tests of legal proce-
dures not addressed here." The most obvious example is the decision to
grant certiorari. If our model is correct, then the Supreme Court may de-
cide, in part, to grant certiorari based on a combination of expertise and
politics. One could get the certiorari votes of justices, the politics of the
lower courts, and the nature of the outcome in the court below. One could
then predict that when conservative (liberal) justices review a conservative
(liberal) decision by a liberal (conservative) lower court, certiorari would
be refused.73 One could then compare the rates at which justices voted for
certiorari in such circumstances, compared to all others. Control variables
would be needed.
Our framework might also help to explain the rate at which appellate
courts grant oral argument. Assume that the refusal to grant oral argument
indicates that no real review is taking place in that case.74 Then our model
would predict that conservative (liberal) appellate justice would not review
a conservative (liberal) outcome from a liberal (conservative) lower court.75
One could collect these data and analyze it, testing our prediction.
IV. CONCLUSION
This paper has presented a simple framework for analyzing a hierarchical
system of judicial auditing. We have concentrated on (what we perceive to
be) the two most central reasons that courts and/or legislatures tend to scru-
tinize the decisions of lower-echelon actors: imprecision and ideological
"' For example, the Senate Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Administrative Over-
sight and the Courts has recently circulated questionnaires to federal judges inquiring about
judicial use of decision-making resources, support staff, and extrajudicial activities. ABA Re-
port, supra note 5, at 3 1.
72 We are indebted to the editor for these suggestions.
7 Assuming that the relative levels of precision were appropriate.
7 The refusal to grant oral argument might also have other causes. The briefs might have
been so good as to render further argument useless. Or the briefs might have been so dreadful
that the appellate judges want to spend no time with the lawyers on the case. Such explana-
tions should be unsystematically distributed with respect to the phenomena discussed in text,
and hence should not derail the arguments.
" Once again, assuming appropriate levels of precision.
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bias. In comparing these two reasons, we have illustrated how each may
yield systematically distinct auditing and reversal behaviors. While concern
over imprecision tends to bring about evenhanded auditing/reversal, con-
cern over political bias tends to engender significantly more one-sided strat-
egies. Examples of these tendencies can be found in a number of legal ap-
plications, including administrative law, constitutional law, and interpretive
theories of jurisprudence. Moreover, these tendencies may provide a helpful
informational proxy by which to evaluate the existence and magnitude of
purported threats to judicial independence. Finally, our analysis suggests
that political "diversity" among initial decision makers (in addition to its
other laudable goals) may be an important and generally underappreciated
means for economizing on judicial administrative costs and easing the
workload burdens on upper-echelon actors.
APPENDIX
This Appendix explores a more general framework of analysis, from which the
numerical results in the text were drawn. Recall that the model described in Section
II contained the following variables:
L = Low court (or administrative agency, or unified judiciary);
H = High court (or court reviewing agency, or unified legislature);
Yo = status quo ante;
y, = new regulation; assume (without loss of generality) that Yo <Y y;
X = random variable describing the "true" state of the world. Realizations of
this variable are denoted by x, and we assume X - N(ji, I/t);
Z = random variable describing the signal received by L, assumed normally
distributed around the true state with precision 'y; Z - N(x, l/y);
V = random variable describing the additional signal received by H, assumed
normally distributed around the true state with precision y; V - N(x, 1/
a); and
c = H's costs of auditing, where c E C -= [0, o); c - G(c), with associated
density function g(c) > 0. The value of c is realized and observed only
after L issues its opinion (and the rigor of H's docket becomes known).
For notational ease, let Ai E (Deny, Grant) represent H's auditing strategy given
a holding of yL = yi by L.
The solution concept we use for solving this game is perfect Bayesian equilib-
rium. We shall conjecture one solution (though there may be others) that corre-
sponds with a "trigger strategy" profile for both L and H, as follows:
L: yL = y, if and only if z - z*;
H: A0 = Grant if and only if c - ct;
AI = Grant if and only if c -- c*;
yH = y, if and only if v v* (so long as H's signal is informative);
yH = y, if and only if z - z** (if H's signal is uninformative).
To confirm that this indeed is an equilibrium, we proceed through standard back-
ward induction techniques. First, we consider the optimal actions of H assuming
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the auditing decision has been made. Second, we move backward to consider H's
penultimate decision about whether to audit L's decision. Finally, we consider L's
opinion in the initial case.
A. H's Strategy Conditional on Auditing yL
Suppose first that L has issued a judgment and that H has decided to audit this
judgment. This is the last possible stage of the game, in which H need not consider
the costs of auditing (which are now sunk) and can concentrate solely on choosing
between Yo and y, so as to maximize expected utility conditional on the realizations
of signals z and v. For clarity of exposition, we shall assume in what follows that
if a court is indifferent about the two potential outcomes, it will break the tie by
upholding the new regulation.76 An equivalent statement of H's problem, then, is
as follows:
min E{(y - X)21z, v}. (Al)
YE Yo,YI)
Analysis of this expression yields the following lemma:
LEMMA 1. If H audits L's decision, it will favor yi over Yo if and only if
Tg~ + 'jZ + GFV > YO + 3"Tq + Yz + C y 2Y
Proof Equation (Al) implies that y, yields a (weakly) greater payoff for H than
does Yo if and only if
E{(y, - X) 21v, z} !5 E{(y 0 - X) 21v, z}, (A2)
which-after expansion-simplifies to
E{Xlv, z} > Yo + Y (A3)
2
Now recall that the players' prior beliefs are that X - N(gt, lit). Since ZIX - N(x,
1/y) and VIX - N(x, 1/a), applying Bayes's rule one finds that the posterior distri-
bution of X, conditional on the realizations of Z and V, is N((TJgt + yz + av)f(t +
y + (), 1/(C + y + ())." Substituting the mean of this conditional distribution for
the left-hand side of equation (A3) yields the expression given in the lemma. Q.E.D.
Assuming for the moment that a > 0, then lemma 1 implies that H favors y
'
H =
Y, if and only if
v +v(z) Y° YI(t + y+ a) - ( ")(A4)
Conversely, if a = 0, then H will hold yH = y, if and only if
Z --- z* = Yo + Y + ,) -7. (A5)
2yY
This establishes the first portion of our conjectured equilibrium: that is, conditional
76 This assumption is easily relaxed without loss of generality.
77 See DeGroot, supra note 21, ch. 10.
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on auditing, H will hold y" = yi whenever v -- v* and signal V is informative butyH = y, whenever z --> z** and signal V is uninformative.
B. The Decision to Audit
Consider now the analysis of H's auditing decision. Recall that when H must
choose whether to audit L's holding, she is privy to very little information. In fact,
all that H knows is the outcome favored by L. But because L can favor either of
the two outcomes, it is necessary to consider H's strategy for both a lower-court
holding striking down the new regulation (Yo) and one that upholds it (yl). One
must consider these cases one at a time.
1. Auditing a Holding for the Status Quo. Suppose first that L has struck down
the new regulation (so that yL = Yo). Under the assumption that L has followed the
trigger-point equilibrium strategy conjectured above, H will attempt to assess the ex-
pected net gains from auditing. In particular, H will audit only if her expected utility
from doing so exceeds that of abstaining. Equivalently, H will audit if and only if
E.{(yo - X)21z : z*} - c + E,{E.{(yH - X) 21v, zilz :- z*}. (A6)
The intuition behind this expression is simple. If H abstains, she will receive its
expected payoff from yo denoted on the left-hand side of equation (A6) knowing
only that z :-- z*. If H audits yL = Yo, on the other hand, she will learn both v and
z, but she will bear the cost of c to do so. Viewed at the time of the auditing deci-
sion, however, H must take expectations over the auditing payoff knowing only that
z -- z*. Rearranging equation (A6) yields the result that H will audit Yo if and only
if
c :- c*(z*) = E {(yo - X)2 1z -- z*} - E,{Ex{(yH - X)2 lv, z) Iz :- z*}. (A7)
Thus, H will audit a holding of Yo if and only if c :- co(z*), which corresponds to the
hypothesized trigger point equilibrium strategy. Moreover, the ex ante probability that
H audits a holding of yo is equal to G(ce(z*)), which we denote Gt for short.
2. Auditing a Holding for the New Regulation. A symmetric analysis applies
to the case of auditing a holding of Y, by L. Consequently, H will audit a holding
of y, if and only if
c - c*(z*) - E {(yl - X) 21z > z*} - Ev,{E{(y1 - X)2Iv, zl Iz > z*1, (A8)
which corresponds to the hypothesized trigger-point equilibrium strategy. The ex
ante probability that H audits a holding of yt is equal to G(cp(z*)), which we
denote G * for short.
C. The Decision by L
Finally, assume that L knows H will audit after a holding of yi with probability
Gt. Thus, conditional on learning z, player L will hold y, if and only if
(1 - G*)Ex{(yo - 0 - X) 2 1z} 2!t (1 - G*)E {(yl - 0 - X)2 1z}
(A9)
+ (Gl* - G*)[E,{E.{(yH - X- 0)21z, v} Izi],
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which expands to
(1- Go*)[ - + (Y -0- Y1]
S(1- 1 + YI - -- + z (A1O)
I + (. T++y]J
+ (G* - G*)[E,{E {(y' - X- e)2Iz, v}lz}].
In all cases where H follows a symmetric auditing strategy (so that Gt = G?), the
conclusion is immediate that L will hold for yi if and only if
z 2 z*= (Y + - 0) (T + 1) 'tA . (All)
When H follows an asymmetric auditing strategy, the analysis is more complex,
and the existence of a trigger-point equilibrium as hypothesized may depend on the
values of the parameters considered. For the examples in the text, however, such
an equilibrium exists and is computed.
